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BRITISH BUSINESS IN ARGENTINA 
This paper examines the scope of British business initiatives in Argentina from the 
mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century and factors that influenced the growth and 
profitability of individual firms. The rapid pace of Argentine economic growth for 
most of the period from the 1870s until the 1940s established the framework within 
which all businesses operated. Growth was defmed in terms of the outward movement 
of the frontier , population expansion, increasing foreign investment and overseas 
trade, the creation of social overhead capital and rising public revenue . Yet, whatever 
indicators were used, economic expansion was predicated upon an international 
division of labour in which the country emerged as a major producer of temperate 
agricultural foodstuffs and raw materials . British businessmen, in particular , 
benefitted from the scale and diversity of interests in the country and from a high level 
of support for the Anglo-Argentine connection in the host society , at least until the 
1930s. British groups applauded Argentine attempts to harmonise domestic institutions 
and practices with international norms. As importers and remitters, the large public 
utility companies and railways recognised the advantages of exchange rate stability. 
Although few British enterprises were registered in the country, most business groups 
in London were also encouraged by the tone of administrative reform and measures 
such as the codification and modernisation of commercial legislation implemented 
around the mid-nineteenth century and by subsequent action designed to foster 
investment, immigration and trade. 
Concurrent with efforts by segments of the Argentine elite to create a new domestic 
order, the accelerating pace of technical innovation and associated restructuring of the 
international economy which occurred after the 1870s had an immediate impact upon 
the organisation and character of British business in the River Plate . The 
communications revolution of the late nineteenth century promoted economic 
integration, reduced entry costs for firms seeking a foothold in new industries and 
markets, and accelerated business decision-making. Improved communications 
between Europe and the River Plate, increased political stability, government 
franchises and profit guarantees all served to reduced risk . Furthermore, the more 
immediate dissemination of information associated with telegraphic communications 
and greater reliability of the mails made for more effective control from London. 
This - coupled with international liquidity in the 18805 followed by recession during 
in the 1890 - stimulated first horizontal and later vertical integration amongst British 
firms . Corporate consolidation (and de-nationalisation associated with the first Baring 
Crisis) enhanced the British profile in several sectors of the Argentine economy. 
Nevertheless , by the turn of the century British companies were exercised by increased 
competition from domestic and other foreign quarters. By the First World War, 
commercial and financial interests were especially concerned about the German 
'menace'. Throughout the twentieth century , British firms were alarmed by an 
enlarged US presence , initially amongst processing activities but later in virtually 
every area . During the inter-war decades, the international fmancial position of Wall 
Street enabled US interest to establish a foothold even amongst the railways and utility 
companies, sectors long regarded as a British preserve and the bastion of British 
business and commercial predominance in the republic . At this stage British 
companies had also to confront a rising tide of economic nationalism in Argentina 
itself. On the other hand , some of these processes occasionally operated to the benefit 
of British firms . Industrial concentration, new business practices and the growth of 
US influence in South America in fact provoked a profound fear of US 'big business' 
in Argentina . Heightened international rivalry in the republic during the 1920s, rather 
perversely , sustained the Anglo-Argentine connection and possibly broadened the pro-
British lobby. British firms continued to enjoy good relations with a government 
reputedly disposed to favour London registered companies over their US counterparts. 
But this was a temporary respite . Britain's piecemeal response to US competition in 
the 19205 and subsequent reaction to the economic crisis of the 1930s tended to place 
immediate ga ins above long-term strategic interests . Ultimately, this undermined the 
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consensus in favour of sustaining Anglo-Argentine links which had re-surfaced in the 
1920s. By the 1940s, many Argentines had come to view British firms as obsolescent 
and clustered in politically sensitive sectors of the economy. While railways and 
public utilities became increasingly anxious about exchange losses and the need to 
sustain a flow of remittances to London, Argentines complained of deteriorating 
services and dearth of new investments. Once the Argentine economy began to grow 
again after 1932, the structural constraints imposed by the failure (or the inability) of 
London-based companies to provide the infrastructural services demanded by a 
dynamic diversifying economy became all too obvious. Perhaps traditional British 
business had simply assumed too high a profile in an area that was becoming 
increasingly dominated by state initiative . With the major exception of companies 
engaged in manufacturing, most British finns were unable to respond effectively to 
nationalism and protectionism. Arguably these same factors were responsible for an 
attitudinal change amongst the British. The last decades of British predominance in 
Argentina were distinct from those of the mid-nineteenth century. In the main, 
anxiety and caution were the order of the day, contrasting with the optimism and 
aggressive behaviour that characterised British business in the third quarter of the 
nineteenth century . 
As implied above, Argentine perceptions of British business in the twentieth century 
were largely shaped by the volume and distribution of investment on the eve of the 
First World War. The massive inflow of new funds from London during the 
immediate pre-war boom consolidated the British position in several sectors and 
heightened Argentine sensitivity to the predominance of British firms . Estimates of 
the absolute weight and relative importance of investment in the republic differ but 
most sources accept that British funds represented around 60 per cent of total foreign 
investment before the war. I By 1913 around one-fifth of the total stock of British 
1 Vernon Phelps, The llllernational Economic Position of Argentina (Philadelphia , 
1938) , p . 246; Guido Di Tella and Manuel Zymelman, Las etapas del desarrollo 
econ6mico argentino (Buenos Aires, 1967), p. 66 . 
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-overseas investment was located in Latin America, about one-half in Argentina which 
had begun to attract an increasing proportion of British capital flows to the continent 
Distribution of British Investment in Argentina, 1910 
Portfolio £63 ,854,644 
Direct £227,256,302 
Railways £166 ,360,683 
Uti lities £25,437,296 
Commerce & bankin g £7,862,400 
Land £10,866,212 
Miscellaneous £14,729,709 
Total £291,110 ,709 
Source: Albert B. Martinez and Maurice Lewandowski , The 
ArgenTine in the Twentieth Century (London, 1911) . p. 358. 
since the 1880s when direct investment in railways and utilities were particularly 
favoured by the London market. 2 
Around the war years , several Argentine scholars devoted a considerable amount of 
effort to estimating and collating information about the value of foreign capital 
invested in the country . The data generated at this time served to fuel a debate about 
2 1. Fred Rippy, British In vestments in Latin America, 1822-1949 (Minneapolis , 
\959), see especially chapters 3 and 4. 
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both the British presence and the prevailing economic and social structure among 
contemporaries and latter historians. Clustered in transport (railways and shipping) , 
urban services and banking, British companies were a visible manifestation of foreign 
involvement in export-related activities and of the importance of the external sector. 
Increasing instability in foreign trade, which was echoed in repeated domestic 
commercial, financial and fiscal crises, as well as difficulties provoked by the First 
World War and subsequently the events of the 1930s, fostered a re-appraisal of the 
relationship with Britain and about the growth model which had emerged from the so-
called ' liberal project' of the 1880s .3 As the external environment deteriorated and 
domestic conditions changed (most obviously, the 'closing' of the fontier, the 
beginnings of middle class political mobilisation and social protest by urban workers), 
conflict between Argentine interest groups and British firms mushroomed and the 
welfare gains resulting from openness to the world economy and laissezjaire political 
economy were questioned . 
Conservative nationalists associated with the influential Revista de econom[a argentina 
began to detail the economic problems of the republic, emphasising the inadequate 
development of 'national' industries, high labour costs , external indebtedness and 
short-comings in fiscal and monetary policy .4 Later, during the 1930s and 1940s, 
radical critics - from the left and the right - focused attention more narrowly on the 
3 For accounts of the project, the period and some of the debates, see Gustavo 
Ferrari and Ezequiel Gallo (eds .) La Argentina del ochenta al centenario (Buenos 
Aires, 1980) 
4 See, in particular, the works of Alejandro E . Bunge, La econom[a argentina 
(Buenos Aires , 1928-30), Los problemas economicos del presente: poblacion, lrabajo, 
costa de la vida, poder de la compra de la moneda, producion e industrias nacionales 
(Buenos Aires, 1920) and Riqueza y renta de la Argentina: su distribucion y su 
capacidad contributiva, (Buenos Aires, 1917). For an informative account of the 
intellectual origins and policy impact of writers associated with the Revista de 
econom[a argentina , see Mark Falkoff, 'Economic Dependency in a Conservative 
Mirror : Alejandro Bunge and the Argentine frustrations , 1919-43' Inter-American 
Economic Affairs 34:4 (1982) . 
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British connection. Polemicists attacked British investment, held responsible for 
disrupting the Argentine growth trajectory, and the asymmetry in Anglo-Argentine 
relations typified by 'unequal' bilateral trade and clearing pacts signed during the 
1930ss The controversy was more than academic. It had a policy impact. Absorbed 
by Peronist and Radical politicians and strategists, these sentiments triggered measures 
which, initiall y conceived as anti-British, subsequently became antagonistic to foreign 
interests in general. While revisionist historians , writing mainly in English, later 
challenged the nationalist-cum-dependency thrust of much scholarship produced in the 
middle decades of the twentieth century, the nationalist historiography has had a 
profound and enduring effect. Hence, having been quantified by Argentine analysts 
in the early decades of the century , British investment (and by extension British firms) 
was successively depicted as distortive, inefficient and moribund . 
These issues will be explored below in a sectoral analysis of British enterprises. It 
will be argued that the position of British firms has often been exaggerated, that in 
many cases British preponderance was limited in terms of period or impact. 
Similarly, that the ' Britishness' of many firms may be questioned , certainly during 
5 For a review of the literature , see Peter Alhadeff, ' Dependency, Historiography and 
Objections to the Roca Pact' in Christopher Abel and Colin M. Lewis (eds. ), Latin 
America: economic imperialism and the state (London, 1991), especially pp. 367-8 
and Guido Di TeJla ' Economic Controversies in Argentina from the 1920s to the 
1940s' in Guido Di TeJla and D.C .M. Platt (eds.), The Political Economy of 
Argentina, 1880-1946 (London, 1986). For nationalist and radical accounts, see also 
the works of Raul Scalabrini Ortiz, [Politica britanica en el Rio de la Plata (Buenos 
Aires , 1940), Historia de los ferrocarriles argentinos (Buenos Aires, 1957)} and Jaime 
Fuchs, [Argentina: su desarrollo capitalista (Buenos Aires, 1965), La penetraci6n de 
Los trusts yanquis en la Argentina (Buenos Aires , 1959)] and ' replies' by Harry S. 
Ferns , Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1960) and Peter J . 
Cain and Anlhony G. Hopkins, British Imperialism (London, 1993 , 2 Vols.). Recent 
re-statements of the liberal position can be found in Carlos F . Diaz Alejandro, 'No 
Less than Once Hundred Years of Argentine Economic History Plus Some 
Comparisons ' in Andn:s Velasco (ed. ), Trade, Development and the World Economy: 
selected essays of Carlos F. Dlaz Alejandro, (Oxford, 1988) and Yair Mundlak, 
Domingo CavaJlo and Roberto Domenech, Agriculture and Economic Growth in 
Argentina, 1913-84 (New York, 1989). 
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earlier decades . Organisational changes around the turn of the century consolidated 
a British position in several industries but at the cost of flexibility of response to 
changing conditions in the republic, notably (as already indicated) competition and 
nationalism. 
Merchant Houses: trade, diversification and displacement 
Between 1818 and 1869 the number of 'British' houses trading In Buenos Aires 
fluctuated wildly. According to Reber, there were 55 firms in 1818 but only 28 in 
1825 . Numbers picked up again towards the end of the decade and again during the 
1830s. By the mid 1860s around 27 houses are recorded .6 On the other side of the 
Andes, Mayo shows that 16 British merchants were resident in Chile in the 1820s . 
The figure was 24, out of a total merchant population of 98, in 1849. 7 This compares 
with an average of 14 British firms reported as operating in the whole of Mexico 
between 1822 and 1825 . By 1861-65, while the actual number of firms may have 
been greater, there is hard evidence for only seven British houses trading in Mexico. 8 
In contrast there were about 60 houses in Rio de Janeiro in 1820 and perhaps as many 
again elsewhere in Brazil , though some may have been branches of the larger Rio 
firms .9 At the time Brazil was Britain's most important market in Latin America. 
6 Vera B. Reber, British Mercantile Houses in Buenos Aires, 1810-1880 (Cambridge, 
Mass. 1972), p. 56; D.C.M. Platt, Latin America and British Trade, 1806-1914 
(London 1972 pp. 42, 49). 
7 John Mayo, British Merchants and Chilean Development, 1851-1886, (Boulder, 
1987), Table l.2, p.5. 
8 Hilarie H. de Bohigas, 'British Commercial Houses in Mexico, 1821-1867' 
(University of London, unpublished PhD dissertation 1988) p. 48. See also Hilarie 
J. Heath, 'British Merchant Houses in Mexico, 1821-1860: conforming business 
practices and ethics', Hispanic American Historical Review 73: 1 (1993) pp.263-5. 
9 Platt, British Trade , p. 42 . 
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The success and failure of commercial houses, signalled in the changing number of 
firms, indicates that River Plate mercantile activities were conducted within a shifting 
set of parameters. First, business practices were constrained by the condition of 
communications with the outside world. Secondly, the prevailing political 
environment had a profound impact upon opportunities for , and the conduct of, 
business. Thirdly , the general level of trade, conditions in the local market and 
international commercial trends clearly influenced the scale, nature and direction of 
the trade of individual houses . These factors affected opportunities for specialisation 
and determined whether or not firms that initially engaged in transatlantic commerce 
might be drawn into up-country trade or even retailing and local production. The 
same fac tors also shaped the internal organisation of houses and influenced levels of 
commercial competition. 
In the 1810s British merchant houses had been attracted to the River Plate by the force 
of pent-up demand . Markets that had been starved of imports for years as the result 
of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and the struggles for independence 
against Spain were suddenly opened to British merchants at a time when continental 
Europe and briefly the USA were closed to trade . For a time South America became 
Britain 's principal overseas market and houses proliferated . 10 During the 1820s and 
for some years thereafter, two distinct factors compelled merchant houses to diversify . 
It rapidly became clear during the 1810s that a shortage of exports constrained the 
growth of the import trade once readily realisable stocks of specie and bullion had 
been liquidated. Later, glutted markets, the international commercial and financial 
crisis of the late 1820s , and resulting stagnation, demonstrated that dependence upon 
import business alone was not viable . As a result some houses moved into production 
in order to service imports or to compensate for reduced commercial activities. 
10 T. Halperin Donghi, Hispanoamerica despues de la independencia: consecuencias 
sociales y economicas de la emancipacion (Buenos Aires, 1972), pp . 84-142; Peggy 
K. Liss , Atlantic Empires: The Network of Trade and Revolution, 1713-1826 
(Baltimore, 1983), pp. 213-21. 
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Others shifted into up-country trading as transatlantic commerce contracted or sales 
became more difficult in overstocked coastal markets.1I From the crisis of the 1820s 
until mid century, diversification and a quest for general business characterised the 
activity of surviving commercial houses . British merchants functioned as bankers, 
extended credit to government and invested briefly in mining and more extensively in 
agriculture, while continuing to finance overseas trade and develop northern 
hemisphere markets for Argentine produce. More especially during the 1830s and 
1840s, merchants acquired substantial estates and produced for local as well as world 
markets. New opportunities developed after the 1850s. British and Irish merchants, 
along with other foreign and native estancieros played a key role in the flotation of 
all early railway companies. It mattered little whether these enterprises were 
registered in Buenos Aires or London. 12 
Railway construction had both a direct and indirect impact upon mercantile business. 
In the long-term railways facilitated the growth of markets and rural production and, 
with the expansion of the network during the 1880s, would permit once again a focus 
on trade and the concentration of business in the capital. Although most of the 
British-owned Argentine railways and/or their contractors imported material and 
equipment direct from Britain, railway building by the state allowed merchants to act 
as agents, handling loans earmarked for railway construction and receiving material 
on consignment. 13 Merchant houses might also offer local financial management 
services to railway companies or fulfill an even broader range of management and 
11 Platt, British Trade , pp. 6-10. 
12 Col in M. Lewis, British Railways in Argentina, 1857-1914: a case-study offoreign 
investment (London, 1983), pp. 18-21 and 'The Financing of Railway Development 
in Latin America, 1850-1914', 1bero-Amerikanisches Archiv 9: 3/4 (1983) 257-9. 
13 Reber, British Mercantile Houses , pp. 121-2. 
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administrative tasks for 'small ' London-registered utilities . 14 Certainly most railways 
and utilities drew upon merchant networks in Buenos Aires and financial contacts in 
London when seeking concessions or raising capital. Nevertheless, few merchant 
houses committed large sums to long-term investment in railways. On the contrary, 
while merchants were anxious to promote railway building and provided pump-priming 
funding for several lines, the mercantile psychology was pathologically averse to large 
enterprises requiring both substantial finance and a lengthy gestation period . 
By the end of the century the growth and diversification of Argentine overseas trade 
(in terms of markets and commodities) induced further responses from British 
merchants . Two problems confronted the houses at this point. First, direct contacts 
between producers/suppliers and final consumers resulted in the marginalisation of 
traditional merchant houses. Wheat was increasingly handled by the major grain firms 
who bought locally and supplied European millers directly. Wool tended to be 
purchased in Argentina by representatives sent out by the main Belgian, French and 
even Bradford buyers. IS In the import trades, larger consumers, like the railways and 
state utilities, set up their own buying agencies overseas, while the establishment in 
Argentina of British retail outlets, such as Harrods and Maples , selling directly to the 
public, also constrained conventional merchant business . 16 Second, British merchants 
came under pressure from foreign houses. Originally fore ign firms dealt in British 
goods, later in competitive lines produced by their respective home industries and 
subsequently in new items that were in great demand but not manufactured in Britain. 
Market penetration by foreign houses was said to be due to better marketing (in terms 
14 C. lones, 'The State and Business Practice in the Argentine ' in Abel and Lewis 
(eds. ), Latin America, pp. 188, 193-4; Reber, British Mercantile Houses , p. 126. 
15 Hilda Sabato, Agrarian Capitalism and the World Market: Buenos Aires in the 
pastoral age, 1840-1890 (Albuquerque , 1990), pp. 209 , 212-1; Roger Gravil, The 
Anglo-Argentine Connection, 1900-1939 (Boulder, 1985), chapter 2. 
16 Gravil, Anglo-Argellline Connection , pp. 94-5. 
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of packaging and labelling) and also, when dealing in their national products , by closer 
links with financiers and manufacturers which enabled them to offer easier credit and 
operate on tighter margins . 11 
Several responses were available to British merchant houses . According to D .e.M. 
Plan, British houses , like British manufacrurers, relocated when confronted by 
competition. 18 But th is was not the whole story . Some firms offered facilities to 
buyers sent out from Europe , providing office space and charging overheads to the 
representative of firms for whom the houses had previously bought on consignment. 
Possibly this was a temporary expedient. Along this road lay the prospect of 
absorption by the European principal. Specialisation in new lines of business , or the 
consolidation of dynamic aspects of existing domestic operations, was another 
alternative for houses prepared to concentrate more resources locally. Some houses 
might expand banking activities but this was also a limited option for the furure growth 
of the business was circumscribed by the increasing role of British overseas banks and 
the closer relationship that existed between European commercial houses and banks. 
Yet other houses might focus on land, and develop estallcia aperations while at the 
same time cultivating additional profit as land agents . 19 
Of course, there was still much business. Notwithstanding heightened competition 
from other houses, it was possible to accumulate several profitable agencies and the 
sheer size of the British presence generated opportunities for merchants . The 
formation of Anglo-Argentine utility companies and later the establishment of 
manufacruring enterprises entailed a demand for the skills, judgement and expertise 
of individual merchants. Perhaps these very opporrunities , as much as the 
17 Parliamentary Papers, 1899, 96,449-613. 
18 Platt, British Trade, especially p. 306 . 
19 See Herbert Gibson, The History and Present State of the Sheep Breeding Industry 
in the Argentine Republic (Buenos Aires, 1893). 
11 
restructuring of industrial organisations , facilitated the passing of the ' heroic ' merchant 
house . Such was the scale and diversity of British corporate links with Argentina by 
the turn of the century that merchants were no longer required to venture their capital 
in risky commercial enterprises . Instead, their advice was much sought after by 
London enterprises or their Buenos Aires branches . As the Anglo-Argentine 
connection grew, traditional merchant houses became less visible . They were dwarfed 
by modern business organisation but ' niche' market opportunities proliferated 
Land: family enterprises, colonisation and conglomerates 
Land commanded the attention of the British in Argentina throughout the period. 
Interest in land took three distinct forms : purchase of mortgage bonds; direct private 
investment in real estate; corporate rural enterprises. These modes were not mutually 
exclusive but they did tend to be period specific . Initially there was fairly substantial 
direct investment and settlement, leading in some cases to the formation of estaneia 
companies. Subsequently colonization schemes, along with mortgage bonds , briefly 
commanded attention . Finally, large integrated corporate initiatives came to 
characterise new business ventures. 
Arguably , mortgage bonds (eMulas) lie beyond the scope of this work but deserve a 
passing reference as at one time, in the 1880s, they attracted much attention. London 
became the most important overseas secondary market for cedulas denominated in 
paper pesos. (Berlin virtually monopolised dealings in gold peso mortgage paper.) 
Presented as secure , semi-official paper designed to attract rentier capital, the bonds 
soon became synonymous with unbridled speculation and played a key role in the 
financial debacle of 189020 Estimates of British purchases of mortgage bonds vary . 
Rippy , for example, indicates that bonds to the value of £21 millions had been placed 
20 Harry S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1960), 
pp . 370-1, 420-4. See also , Ferns 'The Baring Crisis Revisited', Journal of Latin 
American Studies (hereafter JLAS) 24,2 (1992) 241-73 . 
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in London by 1890; others claim that the City absorbed nearer £30 millions before the 
bubble burst. 21 This was a large sum. But cedulas were quite distinct from direct 
investment in, and management of, land as an area of business initiative. 
An entrepreneurial approach to the opportunities offered by cheap land was manifest 
in early British contacts with the River Plate. Although it is impossible to quantify , 
qualitative evidence suggests that immigrants from Britain and Ireland were well 
represented amongst landowners in the province of Buenos Aires by the 1860s. As 
indicated in the descriptive accounts of the Mulhalls, extensive British-owned 
properties were characteristic of the centre of the province and were also encountered 
in the south and to a lesser extent the west. More modest properties were to be found 
in northern Buenos Aires 22 The growth of direct private British investment in land, 
particularly in the province of Buenos Aires, may be explained by two sets of 
circumstances . First, the buoyancy of the foreign trade sector which initially attracted 
merchants to the area during the period of independence and subsequent contraction 
in overseas commerce which compelled traders to diversify . Second, the wool cycle 
which stimulated immigration from Ireland and Scotland during and after the 1840s, 
a period of economic crisis and famine in Celtic countries 23 Shepherds settled 
extensively in the northern and western partidos of the province and large British-
owned sheep runs were encountered in other districts. 
21 Rippy , British Investments, p.38; Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 422. 
22 M.G. and E.T. Mulhall, Handbook of the River Plate Republics. Comprising 
Buenos Aires and the Provinces of the Argentine Republic and the Republics of 
Uruguay and Paraguay (London, 1875), pp. 101, 103, 113-53 and Handbook of the 
River Plate Comprising the Argentine Republic, Uruguay and Paraguay (Buenos 
Aires, 1892) , pp . 77 , 78 , 80-92, 95-6, 99-100, 115-6,3 13-4,328-71. 
23 Juan C. Korol and Hilda Sabato, Como fue la immigracion irlandesa en Argentina, 
(Buenos Aires , 1981) , p. 7. 
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Most merchants were primarily interested in supplying the domestic market with 
imports , and only became involved in agriculture when sluggish export expansion 
constrained import demand . Merchants also invested in land during moments of 
commercial depression, or blockade, as an alternative to abandoning the River Plate. 
Land , like gold , was a convenient store of capital at a time of currency and exchange 
fluctuations. Above all land was cheap and, for British merchants, a relatively secure 
medium-term investment. The particular character of the Rosas regime (1829-1852) 
ensured that there was always demand for land even if the land market was 
occasionally glutted. Land , or rather land certificates, served as currency and was 
sold to finance government expenditure. Moreover, given the near perpetual state of 
warfare that existed for much of the Rosas dictatorship, the state was itself a consumer 
of rural products such as draught animals, mounts, meat, leather and fodder. Local 
demand was solid even when overseas trade was slack. Amidst the turmoil , British 
merchants held a privileged position . They and their property enjoyed consular 
protection: of the principal landowners they alone were virtually immune from 
sequestrat ion .24 
Sheep rais ing promised to be even more lucrative, and imparted renewed vigour to the 
land market. Wool production entailed more than a substitution of sheep for cattle; 
it necessitated a new approach to land management and the attraction of specialist 
labour. Immigrant Scots, Irish and Basque shepherds rapidly built up their own flocks 
since they were rewarded by a share in the increase in the flock and output of wool. 
During the early decades of the wool cycle, it was common for 50 per cent of new 
born lambs and the wool clip to go to the land owner and the other half to the 
shepherd . With land relatively easy to obtain, immigrant shepherds soon acquired 
estates 2 5 Accordingly, the density of rural settlement increased (the land could carry 
24 John Lynch, Argentine Dictator: Juan Manuel de Rosas, 1829-1852 (Oxford, 
1981), p.220. 
25 Sabato , Agrarian Capitalism pp . 89-92, 107-114, 158-60. 
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more sheep than cattle and sheep raising was more labour intensive than ranching). 
In the partidos where sheep runs were first established, estates were subdivided and 
landownership became more diffuse. Population increased and demand for imports 
grew. 26 
British investment in Argentine land underwent a major change in the 1860s and 
1870s, namely , diversification and institutionalisation as corporate entities took the 
place of family-run businesses. Two forms of corporate initiative may be observed. 
One involved the productive exploitation of land and presupposed a long-term 
commitment to estate management and development. The other, colonisation, was 
more speculative and assumed a quick return on capital following the disposal of 
property to settlers . The origins of these land companies can be traced to the British 
merchant community in Buenos Aires, to London-based emigration agencies and to 
British-owned joint stock companies already functioning in Argentina. Why did 
landowners dispose of their estates at this time? As Miguez has shown, some estates 
were converted into private joint stock companies for administrative convenience, 
others to raise funds for improvements, notably during the 1870s 27 The cost of estate 
modernisation certainly explains why some proprietors went public, while the profit 
record of these firms demonstrates why issues were well received on the London 
market. Most early companies raised additional funds by selling debentures. Equity 
stock continued to be held by a narrow circle of individuals , usually the descendants 
or close associates of the original estanciero. Yet others may have sold up in settled 
areas to buy cheaper, fertile land on the frontier. 
26 Gibson, Sheep Breeding Industry , passim; Ricardo M. Ortiz, Historia economica 
de la Argentina (Buenos, Aires 1955), I pp. 67-72; Eduardo 1. Miguez, Las tierras 
de los ingleses en la Argentina, 1870-1914 (Buenos , Aires 1985), p. 25; Korol and 
Sabato, Coma fue la inmigracion, pp. 89-101 ; 10nathan C. Brown, A Socio-economic 
History of Argentina, 1776-1860, (Cambridge, 1979) pp . 84-5, 87. 
27 Miguez, Las tierras, pp. 32-58, especially pp.38 , 46-7 , 48-9, 55. 
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If individual estancieros wished to sell, there was also official support for 
immigration 28 Some provincial governments - notably Cordoba and Santa Fe - signed 
contracts with European colonisation companies and progressive legislation was widely 
reported in the press. Little of substance was achieved in terms of a US-style 
homestead act, but it was a good time to sell land . Unsurprising some landowners 
looked to colonisation schemes to valorise their properties and to realise capital. This 
was a good time for merchants to liquidate investments in land. 
The first agricultural colonies were established in 1858 but most early foundations led 
a precarious existence. Some 34 colonies had been set up by 1872, the majority being 
laid out between 1867 and 1871. Of these, the Mulhalls list 12 - including the Welsh 
colony in the Chubut - that had either been founded , or were administered, by British 
interests in 1875. Some colonies were organised by British merchants based in 
Buenos Aires; other firms operated from London. Nevertheless , at this time the 
largest colonisation businesses were run by companies principally involved in quite 
distinct sectors, namely the Central Argentine Railway and the London and the River 
Plate Bank Limited . The Central Argentine Land Company Limited was originally 
set up as a subsidiary of the railway to administer its land grant. The grant was 
exceptional in Argentine railway history: it was virtually the only company to obtain 
a land gram on the US model. The bank acquired property by foreclosing. Both the 
bank and rai lway used the opportunity provided by the conjuncture - official support 
for colonisation, immigrant interest and London stock market preference for Argentine 
paper - to floa t colonization companies and dispose of land. But generally the 
business received a bad press in Britain almost as soon as it started. Many schemes 
were transparently speculative, risky for prospective emigrams and potential 
28 H. Mabragafia (ed .), Los mensajes: historia del desenvolvemiento de la naci6n 
Argentina redacrada cronologicamente por sus gobernantes, 1810-1910 (Buenos Aires , 
1910). 
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investors 29 The history of colonisation companies, as opposed to some of the estancia 
enterprises, was disappointing. The unhappy fate of several colonies and the growing 
appeal of cMulas undermined the position of land companies registered in Britain 
during the late 1870s and early 1880s. Encumbered with land bought at inflated 
prices , most collapsed during the Baring Crisis . 
The final phase of British investment in River Plate land was less speCUlative. 
Undertaken around and after the turn of the century, some enterprises emerged from 
restructured and recapitalised companies bankrupted in the 1890s; others were 
modelled on private estancia companies of the 1860s . Nevertheless, these new 
enterprises were distinguishable from earlier entities by the extent of their landholding 
and scale of operations, and by their enduring success. Most of the new businesses 
were major public companies involved in various activities in Argentina and/or 
engaged in similar operations elsewhere. These firms also operated in distinct areas 
of the republic . Controlling huge territories, the newest ventures were to be found in 
the far north and north east, from where operations sometimes extended across the 
frontier into neighbouring republics , or in the far south. Operations in the two areas 
were, of course , quite different. In Patagonia proper companies were involved mainly 
in sheep and wool production: on the northern fringe of the territory hard and stone 
fruit was grown . In sub-tropical zones along the frontier with Paraguay and Brazil -
in the Gran Chaco and northern mesopotamia - cattle, timber and quebracho extract 
were the main products , with some corporate initiative also in cotton, tobacco, sugar 
and citrus fruit. Colonisation constituted a relatively small part of this business. 
These companies were primarily involved in production. 
Arguably, the expansion of British interests in the south was initially the most 
dramatic . As cereal cultivation spread south and west across the pampa humeda 
29 Colin M. Lewis ' La consolidaci6n de la frontera Argentina a fines de la decada 
de 70: los indios, Roca y los ferrocarriles' in Ferrari and Gallo (eds.) , La Argentina. 
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around the turn of the century both in response to increased world demand for grain 
and also as part of the process of land improvement associated with the preparation 
of estates to take the prime fatstock required by the new frozen and chilled meat trade, 
sheep were displaced to ' marginal' land in the south. According to Bayer, substantial 
tracks of Patagonia were acquired by the British, both by means of direct private 
investment in national land and, more especially , the transfer of huge estates to the 
new wave of land companies such as the Argentine Southern Land Company Limited , 
the Port Madryn Land Company, the Rio Negro (Argentine) Land Company Limited 
and the Tecka Land Company .30 
Corporate land holding certainly increased in the north during the inter-war decades . 
The major British companies were the Argentine Estates of Bovril Limited, Liebig 
Extract of Meat Company and the Forestal Land , Timber and Railways Company . 
All were engaged in ranching but Liebig and Bovril specialised in the manufacture of 
bouillon cubes and paste , and canned and frozen beef. Operating in the River Plate 
since before the turn of the century , Leibigs and Bovril possessed ranches and plant 
in neighbouring republics . Leibigs , in particular, had extensive interests in Paraguay, 
Uruguay and southern Brazil. These companies were atypical of British meat 
processing firms based in Argentina in that they were involved in cattle production 
besides processing and the marketing of branded products. But with the restructuring 
of the world meat industry during the early decades of the twentieth century both firms 
were forced to reorganise their South American business . Between the 1900s and the 
1920s international trade in meat products was transformed by two key developments . 
First, there was a decline in meat exports from the United Sates of America and a 
corresponding rise in the importance of River Plate suppliers. Secondly, technological 
changes fostered the production of high grade chilled beef. This displaced frozen meat 
and traditional commodities such as canned meat and extract. Consequently, 
30 O. Bayer, Los vengadores de la Patagonia tragica (Buenos Aires, 1974), I p. 38; 
Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railway Company Limited , Directors ' Annual Statement 
of Accounts, 1910 (London , 1910) , see map; Mfguez, Las tierras, pp. 251-3. 
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producers wishing to remain in the canning and extract business were forced to reduce 
production costs by moving to areas of cheap, low grade pasture and by integrating 
their operations. By relocating, Liebigs and Bovril were able to meet the challenges 
of the period because they ran tightly organised operations in several areas and had 
established brand leadership for their ' low grade' products. They were able to 
command a larger share of a declining market. 31 
Other British land companies operated in northern districts . For example, the Santa 
Fe Land Company and the Santa Fe and Cordoba Great Southern Land Company 
whose names consciously echoed those of regional railways. The railways and land 
companies were usually closely connected; they shared bankers , directors and some 
shareholders. These land/railway firms originated in attempts by provincial 
governments before 1890 to promote settlement and infrastructural modernisation . 
Public land had either been made available to speculative ventures or mortgaged to 
secure loans for state initiatives . Following governments default and the failure of 
official colonisation projects , land and rai lways were transferred to European bankers 
representing the bondholders. Yet, as Mfguez shows, second generation of northern 
colonisation companies were no more successful than their predecessors . Only when 
these companies turned to other activities were they even moderately prosperous.32 
Success and prosperity, however, were the hallmark of the Forestal Land, Timber and 
Railways Company Limited . Forestal was the local flagship of a constellation of 
River Plate companies associated with the d 'Erlanger group .33 The group was initially 
a financial consortium involved in the flotation of inter-locking enterprises, notably 
31 Colin Crossley and Robert G. Greenhill 'The River Plate Beef Trade' in D .C.M. 
Platt (ed. ), British Imperialism, 1840-1930: an inquiry based on British experience in 
Latin America (Oxford , 1977), pp . 322, 324, 325 , 327, 334. 
32 Miguez, Las tierras, pp. 183-8, 195 , 198-9. 
33 See M. Cowen, 'Capital, Nation and Commodities: the case of Forestal Land , 
Timber and Railway Company in Argentina and Africa, 1900-45' in J.J . van Helten 
and Y. Cassis (eds .), Capitalism in a Mature Economy (Aldershot, 1990). 
19 
railways, utilities and land companies. Funds were mobilised in various markets; 
London, Paris and Berlin as well as the Low Countries . Forestal owned extensive 
estates in Argentina and Paraguay and , as its name implies, provided the transport and 
processing facilities required for its logging and cattle businesses . Tannin extract 
constituted the core of the company's activities and Forestal rapidly assumed a 
dominant position in the industry and in the region. 
Drawing upon London finance and stimulated both by opportunities for expansion 
provided by the First World War and the need to readjust during the post-war 
collapse, Forestal bought out or merged with several single plant operators . An 
unassailable position was established and by the late 1920s the company accounted for 
over two-thirds of the capital invested in the quebracho industry and over two-fifths 
of tannin extract production. 34 From this leading position Forestal was better able to 
weather the storm of the inter-war depression and to respond to the recovery in world 
demand towards the end of the 1930s. Overseas Forestal operated an international 
marketing division which functioned in most of the main centres of consumption. 35 
In Argentina the company possessed some three million acres of forests, several 
processing plants , almost 350 miles of railways which together with a fleet of river 
tugs and barges channelled timber from the logging camps to processing stations. The 
expansion of the cattle business gave the firm added flexibility as did the option to 
develop cotton and tobacco, cash crops that became increasingly important 
domestically in the 1930s. 
British holdings of land in Argentina during the twentieth century are clearly 
underestimated in the published data . Miguez argues that the real value of corporate 
land holding in 1913 was substantially greater than the £13 - £15 millions recorded in 
most sources and that this figure should be written up by 50 percent and possibly 100 
34 The Times , The Times Book 011 Argel1til1Q (London, 1927) p. 237 . 
35 Cowen, 'Capital , Nation and Commodities', pp . 194-6,208-11. 
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per cent 3 6 Published data underestimates the value of investments made in Argentin 
even by companies listed on the Stock Exchange. In addition, conventional data fails 
to capture most of the private land companies and totally ignores investment in 
farming and ranching by Britons resident in the River Plate . If Miguez's arguments 
are accepted, the resulting figure would place investment in land at around 10 per cent 
of the global figure in 1913 , assuming total nominal British direct investment to be 
£357 millions 37 With the consolidation in the 1920s of estancia businesses in the 
south and with the growth of ranching in the north at a time when there was little or 
no increase in the principal areas of British initiative , the proportion of investment in 
land may have been even greater by 1929. 
The scale and diversity of investment in land, notably the survival of a large private 
investment stake, coupled with the tendency to set up family estancia enterprises, 
created openings for a new type of local British company, the estancia management 
agency. Gibson Brothers was the best - and also the most enduring - example, 
becoming by the 1920s the largest company of its kind in the country. These 
companies survived - and even prospered -for some time after the railways and utility 
companies which experienced virtually a permanent crisis in the 1930s and 
disappeared in the 1940s. For example, the Argentine Land and Investment Company 
Limited declared ordinary dividends of around 10 per cent a year fairly consistently 
during the 1920s and paid shareholders between 2 and 4 per cent in the 1930s . Tecka 
similarly declared 10 per cent in the mid 1920s and managed from five to eight per 
cent the following decade 38 Some land companies even contrived to provide 
shareholders with a dividend during the Second World War: Tecka declared eight per 
cent although the record of the other companies was more modest. Thereafter, 
36 Miguez, Las tierras, p. 320. 
37 J. Fred Rippy , British Investments in Latin America, 1822-1949: a case study in 
the operations of private enterprise in retarded regions, (Minneapolis, 1959) p . 67 . 
38 The Stock Exchange Year-book, 1939, (London , 1939), pp . 2207 and 2403. 
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however, the situation deteriorated. While Argentine Land and Investment paid 
between three and five per cent during the early 1950s, Tecka and Argentine Southern 
declared nil dividends39 State price regulation, exchange controls and the general 
agricultural crisis of the period finally undermined the position of these companies. 
Later land companies were relatively large integrated businesses involved in the 
production of a diverse mix of products (or a staple and several bi-products) for 
domestic and overseas markets. Moreover, operating alongside domestically-owned 
firms, they were less strategically visible when economic nationalism and 
interventionism ousted iaissez jaire as the prevailing ideology . These ftrIlls may also 
have been less obviously British. 
Banking, Finance and Financial Syndicates 
Argentine financial institutions grew and diversified in response to the needs of the 
economy. Three factors influenced British participation in the sector. First, the 
restructuring of international finance at world level had an impact upon the internal 
organisation of banking houses: the emergence of a global market increased 
competition. Secondly, scope for private initiative was conditioned by interaction with 
the state. The increasing role of government in the banking sector was a constant of 
the period . Finally, rights of issue and monetary policy were factors of first-order 
importance to bankers, particularly during the early part of the period before the 
adoption of the Gold Standard. 
The early history of money and banking in Argentina was one of confusion. Diverse 
regulations applied and distinct currencies circulated. In the north and some central 
provinces , Bolivian silver pesos constituted the principal coinage , and issuing 
institutions often denominated their notes accordingly. Chilean coins and notes were 
to be found in the west. In the littoral (and in Uruguay), Buenos Aires provincial 
39 The Stock Exchange Year-book, 1956, (London, 1956) 1, 616,618,768-9 . 
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bank notes were widely accepted. Most domestic transaction were conducted in paper. 
External transactions were settled in sterling bills and gold, either bullion or specie, 
and foreign coins had the status of legal tender although were normally only 
encountered in Buenos Aires . Not until 1881 was there an attempt to establish a 
national currency. 40 Opinions diverged regarding the developmental function of money 
and banks. Nevertheless, at various points attempts were made to establish the peso 
successively on a silver standard, a bimetallic standard and the gold standard 41 These 
reforms were defeated by a combination of circumstances such as sharp deteriorations 
in the external accounts , pressures upon the budget, and seasonal and cyclical demands 
for credit during phases of rapid economic expansion. 
However , circumstances changed by the turn of the century . Following the Baring 
Crisis, government expenditure was subject to tighter control and more orthodox 
attitudes to banking, finance and currency prevailed. By this time Argentina was 
thoroughly integrated into a world trading and financial system. In 1899 Argentina 
returned to the gold standard . Notwithstanding war-time inflation, the general 
suspension of the gold standard in 1914, piecemeal readoption during the 1920s and 
final abandonment in the early 1930s, there followed a period of remarkable currency 
and exchange stability 42 From the late 1890s until the 1940s currency supply was 
rigidly controlled - possibly excessively so - and the external value of the peso 
carefully managed. The story after the late 1940s was very different, with multiple 
40 Ortiz, Historia economica , I pp. 143, 289-91. 
41 Jose Panetierri 'La ley de conversi6n monetaria de 1864 y la oficina de cambio 
de 1867: causas y consequencies economico-sociales' Desarrollo Economico 20 79 
(1980) 383-412. 
42 Jose Panettieri, 'La ley de conversi6n monetaria argentina de 1899 en el marco 
de formaci6n de la Argentina moderna ' Desarrollo Economico 21:82 (1981) 231-56 
and Devaluaciones de la moneda (1822-1935) (Buenos Aires , 1983), pp. 102-5, 153-4; 
Angel M. Quintero Ramas , History of Money and Banking in Argentina (Rio Piedras, 
P.R. 1965) , passim. 
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rates of exchange, repeated abrupt devaluations and a widening gap between the free 
market and official rates. 
For many years, the most important institution in the country was the Banco de la 
Provincia de Buenos Aires which, as its name implies, was the Buenos Aires state 
bank. Founded in 1863, the Banco de la Provincia was soon regarded as both a 
reputable and an expansionist instirution. By 1882 the bank had established 24 
branches (including the head office) in the city and province of Buenos Aires, was 
responsible for the lion's share of capital invested locally in banking, and held the 
greater part of total deposits. At that point , the premier British bank, the London and 
River Plate Bank Limited , had four branches . In 1884, when the country was 
enjoying one of its early, brief attachments to the gold standard, the provincial bank 
accounted for 44 per cent of capital invested in the Buenos Aires banking system and 
68 per cent of deposits . The national bank was responsible for 28 per cent of capital 
and 14 per cent of deposits while the two British banks held 17 per cent of capital and 
8 per cent of deposits') Nevertheless , both the provincial and national banks failed 
during the Baring Crisis of 1890, and the surviving British instirutions accordingly 
found their share of total deposits soar. 
There were other official banks. Most of the provinces founded state or semi-official 
banks during the 1860s and 1870s but these institutions were of little importance. The 
other major creation was the Banco Nacional, floated by the central government in 
1872. It remained but a pale shadow of the Banco de la Provincia until the Baring 
Crisis. However, in the early 1890s it was reorganised as the Banco de la Naci6n 
Argentina . From this point, as the principal official bank, it gradually grew in 
prestige until it became the dominant instirution in the local market. Although 
chartered as a commercial bank, the BNA was performing quasi-central banking 
functions by the 1920s. At one point, indeed, it appeared that the Banco de la Naci6n 
43 Mulhall , Handbook, 1892, p. 37. 
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might by re-constituted as a central bank. But this was not to be. When a central 
bank was chartered in 1936, the BNA remained by far the largest clearing bank in 
Argentina, in terms of capital, share of deposits and number of branches. Later it 
came to operate a near complete network of branches in the country with outlets or 
affiliates in most of the principal American and west European capitals. 
For much of the nineteenth century, when the British banks were primarily engaged 
in financing overseas trade , regulation rather than competition with state institutions 
was the issue most likely to exercise firms incorporated in London. However, the 
potential for conflict with local firms should not be underestimated during the early 
years. As Charles lones has shown, local bankers were infuriated by the 
unwill ingness of the principal British bank to come to their assistance at moments of 
difficulty, and were thoroughly displeased by the ability of some London instirutions 
to survive when domestic firms were forced to close their doors. Even more 
disappointing were the conservative practices of British instirutions, which were 
considered ill-runed to the requirements of an expanding capital and credit hungry 
economy.44 The first major attempt at regulation occurred in 1887 with the 
Guaranteed Banks Law. Modelled on US free banking legislation, the act was 
intended to increase the number of banks of issue, which would be subjected to 
official supervision (thereby promoting public confidence) and to establish a national 
system of development banking consistent with the requirements of the country. The 
latter objective would, in part, result from the repatriation of the external debt (the 
banks were to purchase national gold bonds, the proceeds of which was to be 
employed to amortise the overseas debt) and the encouragement of new foreign 
investment in the sector. 45 Discriminatory taxation was also threatened . These 
44 Charles A. lones, ' Commercial Banks and Mortgage Companies' in Platt (ed.) 
British Imperialism . See also lones 'The State and Business '. 
45 Ortfz, Historia econ6mica, I pp. 297-8; Charles lones 'The Fiscal Motive for 
Monetary and Banking Legislation in Argentina , Australia and Canada before 1914' 
in D.C.M. Platt and Guido Di TelIa (eds.), Argentina, Australia and Canada: studies 
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reforms were implacably opposed by the British banks, but in fact the threat of action 
by the Argentine state disappeared with the Baring Crisis , which brought down all the 
major official banks. Thereafter - and until the 1940s - Argentine official banking 
practice was highly conservative. When established as an autonomous mixed entity 
in the 1930s, the Banco Central de la Republica Argentina included a substantial 
representation of foreign banks on its board, a feature that prompted outrage in some 
quarters. 46 
It is generally acknowledged that Britons and British institutions played an important 
role in the initial stages of the development of Argentine banking. British merchants 
contributed in various ways. First, they were active in the establishment of official 
banks. Secondly , some merchant houses developed an extensive banking business 
and, with the passage of time, were transformed into banks. Thirdly , resident British 
merchants served as officials of institutions registered overseasY Finally, when 
British overseas banks were floated in London, they sought expertise as well as 
custom amongst the merchant community resident in Buenos Aires . This is illustrated 
by the history of the London, Buenos Aires and River Plate Bank Limited (later 
renamed the London & River Plate Bank) . Registered in 1862, the London Bank was 
the first British overseas bank to operate in Latin America, and it became by far the 
most successful. Over the next few decades it was joined by several British rivals . 
The Mercantile/Commercial Bank was re-structured as a limited company in 1872; the 
English Bank of the River Plate Limited founded in 1880; and the Anglo-Argentine 
in comparative de velopment, 1870-1965 (London, 1985), p . 130. 
46 Scalabrini Ortiz, Politica britanica, pp . 142-4. See also lorge Fodor, 'The 
Origins of Argentina's Sterling Balances, 1939-43' in D.C.M. Platt and Guido Di 
Tellas (eds .), The Political Economy of Argentina, 1880-1946 (London, 1986), pp . 
158-9. 
47 David loslin , A Century of British Banking in Latin America: to commemorate the 
century in 1962 of the Bank of London and South America Limited (London, 1963), 
pp. 17-41; Reber, British Mercantile Houses , pp. 114, 118, 120. 
26 
Bank Limited in 1889. There were also foreign competitors. During the early 1870s, 
before the failure of the privately-owned Brazilian Banco Mauei in 1875 , some eight 
banking firms functioned in the city of Buenos Aires, including the national and 
provincial banks. On the eve of the Baring Crisis there were approximately twice that 
number. French, German, Italian and Spanish houses opened, promoted by their 
respective local merchant communities during the 1870s and 1880s, drawing to a 
greater or lesser degree upon European capital. A further round of foundations took 
place between 1899 and 1906 when five new institutions opened to receive deposits . 
In 1910, before the appearance of US institutions, there were 17 banks doing business 
in the city of Buenos Aires, including four British houses - the Anglo-South American 
Bank Limited, the British Bank of South America Limited, the London and Brazilian 
Bank Limited and the original foundation, the London and River Plate. 
The First World War effected dramatic changes and, in particular, two tendencies 
became clear. First, there was an improvement in domestic credit provision associated 
with an enlargement of branch banking, mainly by the official banks. Second, the 
overseas banking community continued to grow . The proliferation of US banks was 
the most pronounced feature of this second trend. ' 8 By the 1920s the British banks 
accounted for about 12 per cent of capital invested in the sector, held a little under 10 
per cent of total deposits and were responsible for a shade above 9 per cent of 
discounts and advances. The British banks held well above 10 per cent of the 
system's cash reserves 4 9 As Jones confirms, the position of British banks was one of 
declining relative importance throughout the twentieth century, notwithstanding a 
flourishing business in the 1920s and scope for diversification thereafter. 
48 Barbara Stallings, Banker to the Third World: US portfolio investment in Latin 
America, 1900-1986 (Berkeley, 1987), pp. 66. 
49 Times Book, p. 191. 
27 
In these circumstances, the British experience was one of growth, rivalry, collapse, 
fusion and ultimately more direct control from London. The course of competition 
and amalgamation is well known from David Joslin's work.5ll As he indicates, there 
were British banks and British banks . Joslin points to differences of approach in 
British institutions but fails to acknowledge fully the non-British nature of several 
houses. In terms of the origin of capital, the Mercantile/Commercial Bank could 
hardly be described as a London institution: most of its capital was raised locally . 
The Anglo-Argentine depended heavily upon European finance . It may also have been 
the case that later creations, confronted by the established position of the London 
Bank, perforce had to cultivate new business. In this there may be parallels between 
the later British banks and German houses. 51 British and other late-corners tended to 
become more directly involved in production and lent long. Indeed , the failure of the 
Anglo-South American was largely attributable to the scale of loans advanced to 
Chilean nitrate producers and long-term credits advanced elsewhere.52 Earlier British 
failures can also be explained by an incorrigible trait all too readily acquired by firms 
well versed in the ways of the local market or excessively influenced by positivist 
European banking traditions associated with the credit mobilier, namely of lending 
long against ordinary deposits. 
From the first , the London Bank decided to confine business to short-term loans 
secured upon concrete, easily realisable , assets. In practice this meant accommodating 
the seasonal credit demands of producers and exporters and the acceptance of nothing 
but the very best merchant paper. Similarly, exchange business was supposedly 
conducted only on the basis of commercial requirements and managers were expressly 
50 Joslin, A CenlUlY of Banking. See also,Geoffrey Jones , British MultinatiofUll 
Banking, 1830-1990 (Oxford , 1993), pp . 24-5 , 88-89, 141-2, 167-8. 
51 George F.W. Young , 'British Overseas Banking in Latin America and the 
Encroachment of German Competition, 1887-1914', Albion 23,1 (1991) pp . 75-95 . 
52 Joslin , A Centul}' of Banking, pp . 265-73. 
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forbidden to speculate. Of course, in practice, circumstances often diverged from 
London's emphasis upon the ideal. But after early conflicts over the most appropriate 
forms of business and modes of operation, London views prevailed. 53 A focus upon 
only the best traditional operations was also possible because new lines of virtually 
risk-free business emerged later. By the turn of the century, the London Bank held 
the accounts of virtually all the premier British railway and utility companies. Good 
profits by these firms underwrote a significant proportion of local business conducted 
by British banks . Survival and a reputation for prudence meant that the Bank soon 
attracted the private and business accounts of local firms and prominent estancieros. 
The growth of deposits and the stability of funds placed on deposit was crucial. 
It was the guiding principal of British overseas banking in this period that only local 
funds should be employed in local business . While this convention may have 
disappointed Argentines who had initially viewed the opening of the London Bank as 
likely to trigger an inflow of loanable capital from overseas, it was rigidly adhered to 
by a large number of British institutions. In this the British banks differed from US 
overseas banks which initially transferred large sums to Argentina in order to develop 
operations. The practice of British River Plate banks also differed from that of local 
European competitors , especially the Germans , who tended to have much closer links 
with major domestic banks and were consequently able to transfer large sums to 
Argentina when required . Yet, with the passage of time, the practices of even the 
London Bank changed. Having cautioned managers against accepting mortgages as 
security during the early decades, by the turn of the century large advances were being 
made under this head S4 During the early twentieth century, the London Bank took 
a large volume of government paper to the City - possibly on the strength of its 
connection with Lloyds - and also handled short-dated stock in the local market. 
53 Jones, 'Commercial Banks' , pp. 3-40 and 'The State and Business Practice ', pp. 
185-8 . 
54 Jones, 'Commercial Banks' , p. 48 . 
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Much of this business must have been fmanced from the growth of local deposits 
associated with the proliferation of British corporate account. However, unlike its 
competitors in Argentina , the Bank never granted much accommodation to 
industrialists . 55 
Perhaps the greatest change in the London Bank's business occurred in the 1930s, 
1940s and 1950s. Given conditions in London, federal and provincial governments 
began to look to New York for long-term fmance in the 1920s.56 Despite the issue of 
some sterling obligations during the inter-war decades, it would not be until the late 
1960s and more especially the 1970s that Buenos Aires looked again to Europe for 
official accommodation . Government business clearly contracted during the 1930s, 
and any expectation that improvement might take place after the War was dashed by 
the weakness of sterling and heightening nationalism in Argentina . The introduction 
of ad hoc exchange controls in 1931 and greater effective management thereafter by 
the Exchange Control Commission and the Central Bank meant that there was little 
space for private banks . Finally, with a sharp contraction in Anglo-Argentine trade 
and the disposal of the railways and some public utilities after the Second World War, 
the Bank's original staple business went much the same way. Searching for a new 
role, the Bank of London focused upon an area that it had long neglected, domestic 
commercial banking. Surprisingly the 1950s proved to be years of new vigour and 
initiative, particularly towards the end of the decade . Drawing upon the large number 
55 M.l. Barbero, 'Grupos empresarios, intercambio comercial en la Argentina: el 
caso de Pirelli (1910-1920), Estudios Migratorios Latinoamericanos 5:15/16 (1990) 
311-341; Donna J. Guy, 'Dependency, the Credit Market and Argentine 
Industrialization, 1860-1940' Business History Review 48:3 (1984) 532-61; Joslin A 
Century of British Banking , pp. 166, 171. 
56 US Military Intelligence Reports (Argentina) Reel IV-0503, No. 2864, 13 
September 1922; D.E. Moggridge, 'British Controls on Long-term capital movements, 
1924-31' in Donald McClosky (ed .), Essays on a Mature Economy: Britain after 1840 
(London, 1971) ; Carlos Marichal , A Century of Debt Crises in Latin America: from 
1ndpendence to the Great Depression, 1820-1930 (Princeton, 1989), pp. 184-5. 
30 
of branches inherited as a result of the takeover of the Anglo-South American, the 
London Bank addressed itself seriously to internal Argentine needs. Additional 
agencies were opened in the city of Buenos Aires and ultimately a financial subsidiary 
was set up . As a result the bank began to recapture some of the influence, though not 
the pre-eminence, that it had enjoyed in the 18805 and 1890s$7 
The overseas banks present the most public image of a British business presence in the 
financial sector. But there were other, less visible groups, namely the mortgage 
companies. The most important British firms were the River Plate Trust Loan and 
Agency Company and the Mortgage Company of the River Plate . These two houses 
were amongst the largest in the sector and dwarfed other British exotica such as the 
Buenos Ayres Building Society. Their business grew steadily after the turn of the 
century and by 1910 they accounted for over 30 per cent of non-official mortgage 
bank capital. 58 The Trust company was probably the premier fum in the field. It 
enjoyed good links with the London market, acted as local trustee for various groups 
of stockholders, and from time-to-time managed the affairs of small mesopotamian and 
northern railway and utility companies. The mortgage business proved particularly 
lucrative into the 1920s, but then further growth was limited by a dearth of funds in 
London and competition from official agencies. Thereafter the firm survived on 
agency and liquidation business (particularly the settlement of the affairs of smaller 
utilities nationalised in the 1930s and 1940s), continuing in business until the 1970s . 
In some respects the Trust prefigured invesunent groups that appeared briefly in 
Argentina during the early decades of the twentieth century . The most notable were 
the Farquhar Syndicate and the more established d'Erlanger group. These, even more 
57 Bank of London and South America Limited, Report of the Directors and 
Statement of Accounts for the Year Ended 31st December 1964, (London, 1964), p. 
4. 
58 Albert B. Martinez and Maurice Lewandowski, The Argentine in the Twentieth 
Century (London, 1911), p. 277. 
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than the Trust, were involved in speculative funding ventures characteristic of smaller 
European investment banks . The nationality of these agencies was at best opaque. 
Whether registered in Europe or the USA (some operations were also registered 
locally) , they drew funds from several sources and were welcomed in Argentina 
because they promised new 'developmental' finance . As indicated below, they were 
active in areas such as manufacturing which were ignored by more established British 
banks. These institutions were important because their operations expanded at 
precisely the moment that the relative position of firms such as the London Bank were 
challenged by a renewed growth in official banking business and competition from US 
houses. 
Railways and Utilities: flawed primacy 
From the perspective of the mid-l 920s, railways (and to a lesser extent utility) 
companies epitomised British business in the republic . Most firms were profitable, 
had weathered the difficult wartime years with success, and were about to embark on 
a new wave of construction, thereby indicating their blue-chip status on the London 
market and their commitment to Argentine development. Yet within a generation 
these firms had virtually disappeared . Why did railways and utilities first come to 
assume such a dominant position within the constellation of British business in 
Argentina and then disappear so quickly? 
The crucial role of mercantile capital in the formative phase of many railway and 
utility companies in the nineteenth century has been acknowledged. 59 Tramways, 
railways and power companies drew upon Anglo-Argentine merchant capital and 
managerial expertise. London finance was present, though rarely dominant. Overseas 
interests around mid-century were largely technical and subordinate, represented by 
contractors not concessionaires . State interest was manifest both in the political 
contacts of franchisees and fonns of support ranging from tax waivers to capital 
59 Lewis, British Railways, pp. 18-2 1; Reber, British Mercantile Houses, pp. 124-7 . 
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injections. However, during the expansion which occurred in the fmal third of the 
nineteenth century, two tendencies may be discerned . Local fmancial participation 
(though not necessarily managerial control) was diluted due to a surge in foreign 
investment, and state involvement grew, often fmanced through external borrowing. 
Both these trends highlighted the transient role of mercantile capital in the sector. Yet 
even when companies were registered overseas, local luminaries were recruited onto 
Buenos Aires boards and merchant interests continued to be represented by 
directorships in London. 
Early tramways in the city of Buenos Aires were promoted by members of the 
merchant community. The first company was franchised in 1869. Thereafter 
expansion was rapid and accompanied by consolidation on a scale even more 
spectacular than that observed amongst the British overseas banks. 60 The somewhat 
misnamed Anglo-Argentine Tramways Company Limited was formed in 1876 to 
acquire the lines of the first company to open services in the city, the Tranvia 
Argentino. The Anglo raised capital in Britain and Europe. Continental markets 
became increasingly important as additional funds were required to fmance takeovers. 
Mergers occurred in the late 1870s and 1880s and again in the late 1900s . Other 
systems, financed with local and European capital, were incorporated in 1908 and 
1909. 61 At its maximum extent the Anglo ran services over some 430 miles of track, 
about 75 per cent of the total system. An identical process of consolidation occurred 
in the city gas service where the Primitiva company played a role similar to that of the 
Anglo in tramways. For the tramways, the critical factor under-pinning consolidation 
was technical innovation, the shift from animal traction to electrical power. Before 
the advent of electricity, small locally-financed and foreign-registered firms had 
competed more-or-less equally. Once the feasibility and efficiency of electrical power 
had been demonstrated , companies with access to the new technology enjoyed a 
60 Reber British Mercantile Houses , p. 127; Times Book, pp. 122-3. 
61 Times Book, pp. 122-3. 
33 
considerable advantage over their rivals . As de Saes has shown for Brazil , electricity 
was not scale-neutral. A large capital outlay was required to install plant but 
thereafter operating costs were relatively low. The economics of electricity generation 
prompted vertical integration: power companies invested in tramways to guarantee a 
market for their product. Consequently, integrated urban transport and power 
companies rapidly emerged in major cities such as Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.62 
Garcia Heras argues the point convincingly for Buenos Aires. 63 
Hence , the response of utility companies to competition was often amalgamation or 
operating agreements with rivals . Initially , this strategy was accepted by franchising 
authorities , particularly when finns were being pressed to extend services and 
responded that substantial new investment necessitated arrangements to limit 
competition in order to secure profits and shareholder confidence. Subsequently, as 
the Anglo discovered , mass political participation made urban authorities more open 
to the demands of taxpayers and consumers and less amenable to the technical and 
financial arguments advanced by utility companies. As the twentieth century 
progressed, the volume of protest mounted . Many complaints were common to 
virtually all utilities, and involved criticism about the quality of service, charges and 
sluggish network expansion or upgrading. 
Given the nature of its operations, the Anglo was blamed for traffic congestion in 
central Buenos Aires. Its proposed solution was the construction of additional 
tramways in the outer suburbs and underground railways in the centre. However, 
these schemes necessitated agreement with the municipality over fares and competition 
from unregulated minibus (colectivo) operators . In the mid 1920s, when buses were 
62 Flcivio Azevedo Marques de Saes, A grande empresa de servifos publicos na 
economia caffeira (Sao Paulo, 1986), pp. 146-55) . See also, Ana C. Castro, As 
Empresas Esrrangeiras no Brasil, 1860-1913 (Rio de Janeiro, 1979), pp. 102, 110. 
63 Raul Garcia Heras , Transportes, negocios y politica: la compafi.fa Anglo Argentina 
de Tranvias, 1876-1981 (Buenos Aires, 1994), pp. 16-8. 
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running along only a few routes, the Anglo handled over 80 per cent of passenger 
journeys. By 1939 the tramways were carrying only 30 per cent of total passengers.64 
Competition from buses could not have occurred at a worse time, as by the 1930s 
dividend remittances were further eroded by exchange losses. The result was 
inadequate provision for depreciation and reduced operating efficiency which triggered 
a further deterioration in relations with customers and the municipal authorities. 
Echoing earlier stratagems, the Anglo maintained that transport co-ordination, the 
establishment of an urban transport monopoly embracing trams , underground and 
buses , was the only possible solution to its fmancial difficulties and the means most 
likely to secure an efficient urban transport system. The project triggered huge public 
hostility and was only grudgingly accepted by the municipality following pressure 
from the federal government and diplomatic intervention by the British authorities. 
But by then it was too late to save the company . While private capital initially 
enjoyed a majority interest in the mixed Buenos Aires Transport Corporation, as the 
result of a coup de main in 1943 the government effectively nationalised the company, 
marginalising the managerial role and revenue of private, largely foreign, 
shareholders. 65 
The predicament of the tramway company in the 1930s and 1940s was singular but not 
entirely unrepresentative . The tendency for local capital to be displaced by foreign 
in the 1870s and 1880s had occasioned little criticism, certainly not when accompanied 
by a promise of new investment and often the retention of the existing management . 
Later denationalisation, for example following the Baring Crisis, when foreign 
capitalists foreclosed following a failure to service mortgage bonds issued overseas , 
was less well received . Utilities were highly vis ible ' natural' monopolies, an easy 
64 Raill Garcfa Heras, Automotores, norte americanos, caminos y modernizaci6n 
urbana en la Argentina 1918-1939 (Buenos Aires, 1985), p. 101. 
65 Raill Garcia Heras, 'State Intervention in Urban Passenger Transportation: the 
Trandpost Corporation of Buenos Aires, 1939-1962', Hispanic American Historical 
Review 74, 1 (1994) 81-110, especially pp. 85-8, 98. 
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target for aspiring municipal politicians . As providers of essential services consumed 
by a wide spectrum of the population, and large employers of labour, foreign-owned 
utilities faced protest on many fronts. In addition, as the first foreign investors in the 
field, British firms were sometimes subsequently confronted by aggressive competition 
from European and US entities who appeared to offer consumers more up-to-date 
services . In the 1920s, British operators in sectors such as electricity generation and 
supply and telephones had to face challenges from Italian, Spanish and US firms . In 
these circumstances, many British firms , like the telephone company, simply sold up . 
Even ' flagship' enterprises like the railway companies were not immune. 
The year 1928 was a traumatic one for British business in Argentina . The transfer of 
some utilities to US conglomerates was but one of several incidents. More alarming 
was news that US financiers were buying into the premier broad-gauge pampean 
railways . 66 The events of the late 1920s were regarded as much more serious in 
Anglo-Argentine railway circles than the pre-First World War involvement of the 
Farquhar Syndicate in British-owned mesopotamian standard gauge lines. Occurring 
on the eve of the inter-war depression, the incident appeared to reveal the fragility of 
British interests in what was still regarded as the key sector. At its maximum extent 
after the Second World War, the Argentine railway network ranked sixth in the world 
with British-owned lines accounting for 57 per cent of total mileageY Mileage 
comparisons at this juncture tend to minimise the participation of non-state enterprises 
as the purchase of most British-owned metre-gauge companies by the federal 
government towards the end of the 1930s clearly reduced private mileage . 
Nevertheless, the contrast with the position in 1896 is marked: after the 
66 Sir Malcolm Robertson, British Ambassador, Buenos Aires, to R.L. Craigie, 
Foreign Office, 14 March 1929. Public Record Office (Hereafter PRO), Foreign 
Office Correspondence (Hereafter FO) 371 / 13460. 
67 F. Barres 'Resefia de los ferrocarriles argentinos' Boletin de la Asociacion 
lnternacional Permanente del Congreso Panamericano de Ferrocarriles 38:86 (1944) 
40,64. 
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denationalisation which followed the Baring Crisis, British companies had held 88 per 
cent of total railway route mileage 68 
As already stated, merchants had been active in the promotion of all early railways . 
Having formed the first company, the FC Oeste, without a profit guarantee but with 
a great deal of direct state funding, merchant capital withdrew and the line was taken 
over by the province. Private initiative was then sustained by the Buenos Ayres Great 
Southern and the Buenos Ayres and San Fernando (franchised by the province) and 
the Central Argentine (licensed by the federal government). Anglo-Argentine capital 
was involved with all these enterprises and was especially well represented in the 
Southern. But the momentum of British railway building began to falter within a few 
years. Between 1876 and 1880 not a single mile of new British-owned track was 
opened . For almost twenty years after 1870 by far the greater part of the expansion 
of the Argentine railway system was accounted for by state construction. New British-
owned companies were floated around 1880 and the rate of increase of construction 
picked up after 1883 but substantial accretions to the non-state sector did not occur 
until the period 1886-93. 
With the liquidation of most government railways after the Crisis , private participation 
rose. Between 1900 and 1914 total route mileage doubled . Expansion was 
particularly rapid after 1907, when the Mitre Law extended for a further 40 years 
exemption from taxation, and was largely accounted for by British lines .69 Another 
new round of expansion was initiated by the British railways in 1924 and closed in 
1931 . National and provincial government had also re-entered the field just before the 
First World War. At about the same time governments also sought to re-activate 
68 Republica Argentina, Segundo censo de la Republica Argentina (Buenos Aires, 
1898), III pp. 463-4. 
69 Colin M . Lewis , British Railways in Argentina, 1857-1914: a case-study offoreign 
investment (London, 1983), chapter 8. 
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continental European interest in Argentine railway development, in part due to conflict 
between established British companies and the rural elite. Three companies were 
floated in Paris after 1902, mainly franchised by provincial governments 70 At 
nationalisation, French-owned lines accounted for something less than 10 per cent of 
total mileage. Government initiative increased again in the 1920s and became crucial 
subsequently: every mile of new track opened after 1935 was inaugurated by the state 
railway executive. Thus alternating (sometimes overlapping) cycles of British and 
government initiative may be observed in the railway sector . 
Like urban utilities , British-owned railways were criticised by contemporaries for high 
charges and tariff structures . Poor quality of service , especially a shortage of rolling 
stock, was a charge frequently heard during periods of rapid export growth .71 Labour 
relations were always an issue and particularly poor around 1907, during the 191Os, 
from time-to-time during the 1920s and from the late 1930s into the war. 72 The 
calibre of management was criticised as was the responsiveness of London boards to 
local requirements. 73 With the rise of economic nationalism and a general questioning 
of the utility of the Anglo-Argentine connexion, these attacks become more frequent 
and persistent. For their part, British companies were often exercised by other 
concerns . The issues of competition and regulation were omnipresent. The non-
fulfilment of financial obligations by government always irked the companies. There 
were perpetual moans about tardy settlement of government accounts (particularly 
70 Andres Regalsky, ' Foreign Capital , Local Interests and Railway Development in 
Argentina: French investment in railways, 1900-1914' , JLAS 21,3 (1989) pp. 427, 
428-30, 435-8 , 439-41 , 442 . 
71 The Economist , 30 June 1888, 46, p . 824; The Railway Times , 14 July 1888, 54, 
p. 50. 
72 Alejandro E. Bunge, Ferrocarriles Argentinos: contribuci6n al estudio del 
patrimonio nacional (Buenos Aires, 1918), chapter 12; Paul B. Goodwin, Los 
ferrocarriles britanicos y la U.C.R ., 1916-1930 (Buenos Aires , 1974). 
73 Evening Standard, 11 December 1928. 
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(particularly profit guarantees) and the failure of state lines to honour railway clearing 
house commitments . After 1907, with the enactment of the Mitre Law which placed 
a ceiling upon profits and gave government the right to adjust tariffs, capital account 
verification concerned every company, since profit rates were determined by the ratio 
of earnings to investment. Exchange losses emerged as an issue after 1925 and 
became of even greater importance with the introduction of exchange controls as did 
the competition from road transport. 74 Relations with home and host governments 
assumed increasing importance during and after the inter-war years. Although they 
had initially been hesitant about involving the Foreign Office in disputes with the 
Argentine authorities, by the 1930s the companies had become incensed at the 
increasingly frequent direct contacts between governments in Buenos Aires and 
London about their long-term fate , and protested vehemently at the lack of 
consultation .75 
Twentieth-century perceptions of British railway enterprises in the republic were 
largely forged in the years immediately following 1907 . This was a period of 
corporate amalgamation , sustained construction and good profits . It was at this time 
that popular cartoonists conjured the image of the English octopus (el pulpo ingles) . 
British-owned trunk lines radiating from Buenos Aires were depicted as tentacles 
firmly in control of the economy, constraining Argentine growth to the requirements 
of British traders and financiers . This view was not entirely accurate: railway 
amalgamation was often only achieved after competitive trunk line construction which 
74 Raul Garcfa Heras, ' Hostage Private Companies under Restraint: British railways 
and transport cordination in Argentina during the 1930s' , JLAS 19, I (1987) pp. 41-67. 
75 Sir Nicholas Henderson, British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, to Anthony Eden, 
Secretary of State , 30 April 1936, Public Record Office, Foreign Office 
correspondence (hereafter FO) 371 /19760: A4446/65 /2; FO Minute (meeting with 
representatives of the Argentine railway companies) 20 July 1936 FO 37 1/ 19761: 
A6105165 /2 . 
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resulted in hostile groups that engaged in periodic tariff wars. 76 Moreover, federal 
and provincial governments were only too anxious to promote competitive railway 
construction. Concessions were often awarded with this object. Rivalry was most 
acute when funds were readily available, for example, during the 1880s and 
immediately before the First World War. Precisely the periods when British 
companies were alarmed by the spectre of continental European, US or state railway 
investment in the highly profitable pampean zone. Hence their alarm at the 
appearance of the Farquhar Syndicate after the turn of the century and rumours of 
share-buying by US capitalists in the 1920s. However, the most teI\ing chaI\enge to 
the primacy of British broad-gauge railway supremacy in the pampas would come with 
highway building projects, notably in the 1930s. 
In attempting to resolve conflicts with labour and disputes with government about 
concessions , operating efficiency and tariffs, the British-owned railways invariably 
preferred to mobilise local contacts before seeking diplomatic assistance . Only in the 
1930s did they come to recognise the importance of seeking official support in 
London. But by that stage the initiative lay with the British authorities themselves 
who, much more than in the 1920s, were prepared to open discussion with Buenos 
Aires about railway matters in advance of an approach by the companies or even to 
act without prior consultation. In 1935 it was the Board of Trade, rather than the 
companies, which inaugurated discussions about railway profitability and purchases 
in the run up to the renewal of the bilateral commercial and clearing agreement. 77 It 
would be interesting to learn of the companies' reaction to an exchange of telegrams 
between the Bank of England and the Argentine Central Bank in 1939 in which the 
76 Lewis , British Railways, chapters 6 and 7. 
77 W. Runciman , President of the Board of Trade, to Sir John Simon, Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, 14 March 1935, PRO FO 371118632: A2872/418/2 . 
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former suggested that the federal government might wish to employ blocked sterling 
balances to purchase railway equity stock. 78 
Increasingly during the twentieth century railway labour relations were also drawn 
more firmly into the political sphere as government paid more attention to welfare 
issues and working conditions . Between the 1890s and the early 1920s railway labour 
struggled to establish cohesive, effective representation that would be recognised by 
companies and state 79 Following waves of labour unrest before 1914, the federal 
government became closely involved in virtually all major disputes, a tendency which 
grew under Radical administrations of the 1910s and 19205 and did not diminish under 
the more authoritarian political arrangements of the 19305. 80 And, for some years 
after 1943, labour generally had much greater access to government in the shape of 
Colonel Juan Domingo Per6n who was anxious to establish a following amongst 
workers. But the railway unions were circumspect in their relations with Per6n, 
aware of the corporatist tendendencies of the regime and anxious to maintain their 
independence of the state .81 
78 S. D. Waley, Treasury, to Foreign Office, 2 October 1939 (see enclosed telegram) 
PRO FO 371122705: A6820/29/2. See also, Raill Garcfa Heras, 'World War 11 and 
the Frustrated Nationalisation of the Argentine British-Owned Railways, 1939-1943' , 
JLAS 17 , 1 (1985) pp. 135-55. 
79 Sir John Macleay, British Minister in Buenos Aires, to Foreign Office, 7 
September 1920, PRO FO 37114417: A6335/6335/2; Macleay to Sir W.G. Tyrell, 14 
October 1921. 
80 See Goodwin, Los ferrocarriles britanicos; C. Portantiero and Miguel Murmis 
(eds.) Estudios sobre Los origines deLperonismo (Buenos Aires, 1974); Joel Horowitz 
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By the 1930s, managerial independence in railway companies and public utilities was 
highly circumscribed and was conditioned as much by government action in London 
as in Buenos Aires. Even before the onset of the Second World War, the approaching 
expiration of the 40 year tax break conceded by the Mitre Law was viewed by some 
as signalling the likely end of British railway companies in Argentina . The critical 
question concerned the nature of the end - expropriation or the establishment of a 
mixed corporation with transfer of ownership and management phased over a longer 
period . 
Processing and Manufacturing: early initiatives and delayed developments 
Early Argentine official publications divided 'industry' into three categories : 
extractive, manufacturing and non-factory . For most of the post-1900 period , the 
major ' industries' were meat packing, flour milling, wine making and sugar refming . 
Textiles , clothing and footwear combined were the second largest branch of 
manufacturing but factory-based production was a twentieth-century phenomenon and 
the output of cotton textiles only grew dramatically during the 1930sY Even factory-
based manufacture was mainly small-scale. Large plants, employing more than 500 
workers accounted for just over 20 per cent of industrial workers in 1935 and hardly 
25 per cent in 1954.83 This situation did not change dramatically until the 1960s. 
At the beginning of the century , manufacturing output represented around 15 per cent 
of gross domestic product. During the 1930s the proportion was 21 per cent and in 
the 1950s about 25 per cent, peaking at 28 per cent in the 1960s before falling away. 84 
82 O. Colman, 'La industria textil y la reconversi6n extensiva del sector industrial 
argentino, 1930- 1943' Revista CICLOS en la historia la econom[a y la sociedad 2:2 
(1992) 
83 Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine 
Republic (London, 1970), pp . 415-6. 504,513 . 
84 Bernardo Kosacoff, 'La industria argentina: un proceso de reestructuraci6n 
desarticulada' in B. Kosacoff et ai, El deafio de la competitividad: la industria 
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In 1935 there were over 37,000 establishments engaged in manufacturing and 148,000 
in 1954.85 Foreign capital accounted for almost 12 per cent of investment in 
manufacturing in 1955 while representing only a shade over 5 per cent of total fixed 
investments. The areas of greatest foreign concentration were to be found in chemical 
and pharmaceutical products (where 35 per cent of the capital was provided by foreign 
firms), electrical machines and appliances (25 per cent) , and rubber products (14 per 
cent). There was also a significant presence in non-electrical machinery and metal 
goods , foodstuffs and beverages, glass and ceramic ware, and extractive activities 8 6 
How did British businesses fit into this picture? In 1940, funds in industry represented 
8. 1 per cent of total British investment in Argentina or 9.7 per cent of direct 
investment. 87 At that time British capital probably accounted for between 15 per cent 
and 20 per cent of total foreign investment in industry. 88 Meat packing alone absorbed 
one-third of British investment in Argentine industry . 
Given the nature of the export trade during the early part of the nineteenth century, 
many merchant houses had invested in meat salting plants , the saladeros , which 
supplied sal ted and dried meat to national and slave markets in the Americas. The 
first modern meat packing plant was the River Plate Fresh Meat Company Limited, 
floated by George W. Drabble in 1882, followed by the Sansinena plant set up in 1884 
and by the Las Palmasfrigorifico inaugurated by Hugh Nelson in 1886. These early 
argentina en transformaci6n (Buenos Aires , 1993), p. 15. 
85 FIAT Concord, Argelltina econ6mica y financiera (Buenos Aires, 1966), p . 170. 
86 l .C . Esteban, Imperialismo y desarrolio econ6mico: la Argentinafrente a nuevas 
relaciones de dependencia (Buenos Aires , 1961) pp . 84-5. 
87 UN Economic Commiss ion for Latin America, Foreign Investment in Latin 
America (New York , 1955), p. 36. 
88 Estimates vary: see F .l . Felix, Argentine Riddle (New York, 1944), pp . 282-3; 
Vernon L. Phelps, The International Economic Position of Argentina (Philadelphia, 
1938) , appendix 11 ; UN , Foreign Capital. p .36. 
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flrms were flnanced by Anglo-Argentine or Argentine capital and were closely 
connected with pastoralists , although the processing outlets were formed as distinct 
businesses , separate from estancieros' cattle interests .89 Several other flrms , such as 
the La Plata Cold Storeage Company, the Smithfleld and Argentine Meat Company, 
Frigorfflco La Blanca and Frigorfflco Argentino, entered the business in the 1900s. 
The River Plate meat industry was highly differentiated and small-scale at a time when 
the global business was becoming internationalised, integrated and extremely 
competitive. 
These structural deficiencies became only too obvious with the entry of US capital in 
1907. US packers looked to Argentina to compensate for a declining export surplus 
in the USA which threatened their overseas markets, especially in Britain. Unlike the 
Anglo-Argentine houses , they possessed extensive investments and expertise in 
specialised refrigerated transport facilities , handling services, retail outlets and in 
'brands '. Within the space of a few years US packers dominated the most lucrative 
business : in 1911 Anglo-Argentine flrms still accounted for 67 per cent and 78 per 
cent respectively of frozen mutton and frozen beef exports but US packers commanded 
64 per cent of chilled beef exports. With each successive ' meat war' that erupted 
after 1907, US flrms gained a larger slice of business. Only after 1922, with the entry 
of Vesteys, did British firms regain some of their ground. Indeed, Vesteys might be 
more accurately described as the flrst British conglomerate to operate in the sector and 
was quite different from the original Anglo-Argentine houses . Like the US packers, 
Vesteys was an established firm in the international meat industry: the company drew 
supplies from diverse sources and was a fully integrated business . Moreover it was 
flnanced from London and did not rely on traditional sources of River Plate capital. 
But even with Vesteys, which operated its own fleet of refrigerated vessels (the Blue 
89 Peter H. Smith, Politics and Beef in Argentina: patterns of conflict and change 
(New York, 1969), pp.33-4; Horacio C.E. Giberti , Historia econ6mica de la 
ganaderfa argentina (Buenos Aires, 1961) , p . 170. 
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Star line) and butchery chain (Dewhurst) , British enterprises could do little more than 
recapture about one-third of the business .90 
At fIrst, cattlemen welcomed the appearance of the US packers as likely to promote 
competition. However, the rapid displacement of smaller ' local' firms by US 
companies soon provoked fears of a meat trust. The response of estancieros was to 
press for greater regulation .91 Later there were demands for state support for a 
producers' co-operative which, following Anglo-Argentine bilateral trade agreements 
during the 1930s, would be allocated a specifIc export quota .92 In the face of 
strenuous opposition by existing meat packers and following a congressional enquiry, 
the establislunent of the Corporation of Argentine Meat Producers (CAP) was 
authorised in 1934 and an export quota allocated to it when the Roca-Runciman Pact 
was renewed in 1936 93 Although some meat was shipped for the company in 1937 
and a processing plant was subsequently acquired , the CAP had little long-term impact 
upon the trade. Notwithstanding the ability of US and British meat-packers to contain 
domestic competition , the long-term future of the companies and the business was not 
good. Cattle production and the chilled beef trade was subject to increasing regulation 
and exports threated by the growth in domestic consumption9 4 In the late 1940s 
90 For an account of the 'meat wars ' see, Simon G . Hanson, Argentine Meat and 
the British Market: chapters in the history of the Argentine meat industry (Stanford, 
1938). 
91 Smith , Beefand POlilics , chapters 3 and 4; Fuchs, Lapenetracion, pp. 193-201. 
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Argentina was hardly able to fulftl meat export quotas to Britain set in post-Second 
World War commercial agreements .95 The situation improved somewhat thereafter 
as cattle stocks increased during the early 1950s but numbers fell again in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. 96 The Anglo-Argentine meat trade never really recovered 
from the foot-and-mouth embargo of 1968. By the 1970s most jrigorfjicos were 
functioning well below capacity , some had ceased to operate and others were 
considering closing operations in Argentina, frustrated as much by a rising tide of 
government regulation in Argentina as an increasingly hostile international 
environment .97 
As with meat-packing houses, the operations of foreign oil companies were also 
subject to closer scrutinty in the 19305. Here, too, there were fears that overseas 
companies were acting in concert against local interests . This led to frequent, 
increasingly hostile, amendments to regulatory regimes during the 19505 and 19605.98 
Shell, for example , which had engaged in local exploration and production in the 
1920s found its business increasingly limited to distribution therafter. 99 Seeking to 
supply the local market, British oil ftrms were subject to growing competition from 
national and foreign firms and ultimately an expanding state enterprises that achieved 
a high degree of integration in the national market, something that was denied to 
foreign companies . Dependent upon overseas sources of supply, British firms were 
95 Review of the River Plate , 107,3030 (1950) p. 18, 111,3102 (1952) p. 28. 
96 FIAT Concord , Argentina p. 137. 
97 Paul H. Lewis , The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism, (Chapel Hill , 1990), pp.320-8. 
98 See George D.E. Philip, Oil and Nationalism in Latin America (Cambridge, 
1982), chapter 21 ; Carl E. Solberg 'YPF: the Formative Years of Latin America 's 
Pioneer State Oil Company, 1922-30' in John Wirth (ed .), Latin American Oil 
Companies and the Politics of Energy (Lincoln, 1985); Marcos Kaplan, Econom[a y 
polftica del petr6leo argentino. 1939-1956 (Buenos, Aires 1957). 
99 Philip , Oil and Nationalism, pp. 166-7. 
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particularly vulnerable both to supply constraints and to domestic competitors, much 
more so than their US counterparts. 
Organizational structure and flexibility of response to a changing political order were 
also critical for the performance of British manufacturing firms . By the mid 1930s 
a number of British manufacturers had set up operations in Argentina. Household 
names such as Dorman Long, Crosse & Blackwell , Bryant and May, Lever Brothers, 
Pilkingtons, and ICI were manufacturing under the industria argentina banner. 100 
Many of these companies were highly successful and their share of the market ensured 
that their operations were already more valuable than indicated by nominal 
capitalization . Most, but not all, of these finns had opened in Argentina during the 
1920s; others had supplied the market from their own depots and agency chains. The 
decision to set up in Buenos Aires was obviously influenced by the buoyancy of the 
market and a lucrative export business previously conducted through specialist 
importers. As the list of members of the Buenos Aires British Chamber of Commerce 
(founded in 19 14) indicates, most major British manufacturers were represented or had 
agents in the country. In some cases the sheer volume, and nature, of the business 
encouraged manufacturers to shift from exporting to local production . But the drift 
towards protectionism during the 1920s was another reason. Faced with increased 
duties, and often by modest local competition, the options facing British companies 
were either to manufacture locally or to abandon the market. 101 And competition was 
100 F . O . Memorandum , Chancery, Buenos Aires Embassy to American Deparunent, 
Foreign Office, 25 March 1935, PRO FO 37 1118628 : A2903/l11l2. See also Theo . 
C . Barker , The Glassmakers, Pilkington: the rise of an international company, 1826-
1976, (London, 1976), p . 389; Patrick Beaver, The Matchmakers, (London, 1985); 
William 1. Reader, Imperial Chemical Industries, a History: Volume ll, the frist 
quaner century, (London, 1975), Charles Wilson, The History of Unilever: a study 
in economic growth and social change, (London 1954) IJ, 353-9. 
101 1.H. Leche , Charge D 'Affaires, Buenos Aires, to Sir R .G . Vansittart, Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 27 May 1924 . PRO FO 371 /9545: 
A3729/ 1136/51 . 
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not entirely local. During the 1920s US firms were also beginning to manufacture in 
Argentina . Whether or not they were led by US firms, British companies recognised 
that once a foreign competitor had set up operations in Argentina, they were 
compelled to do likewise . 102 
The principal differences between most US manufacturers and their British 
counterparts was that British firms often bought into local business. US companies 
were inclined to construct new branch factories. Arguably, this was in part due to the 
sectoral configuration of manufacturing in Britain in the pre-First World War years . 
US manufacturing investment in Agrentina focus sed largely on technically complex 
capital goods and consumer durables, areas where there was virtually no local 
manufacture before the 1920s. Conversly, domestic firms were fairly well represented 
in the production of basic wage goods such as food, beverages and tobacco and simple 
chemicals .103 A classic example of this strategy is provided by the d'Erlanger group 
which bought into several manufacturing businesses. D' Erlanger also introduced local 
companies to potential British buyers looking for outlets in Argentina. Pilkingtons , 
Bryant and May, and ICI had all pursued the same strategy . 
An estimate of 1935 places British investment in manufacturing and extractive 
industries at £15.4 millions . 104 By 1955 the nominal value of direct British 
investment in Argentina was £35 millions (about US$110 millions) of which the 
greater part must have been in manufacturing . By 1965 the total value of investments 
had increased to US$181 millions: almost half was in manufacturing and engineering 
companies , the second largest holding, US$63 millions, was in 'distribution' of which 
102 Tower to Balfour 18 August 1919 PRO FO 371 /3505: AI29279/3379/2 . 
103 Ernesto Tornquist, The Economic Development of the Argentine Republic in the 
Last Fifty Years , (Buenos Aires, 1919), pp.30-31; Lewis, Crisis of Argentine 
Capitalism, pp.35, 41-5 . 
104 Sir H . Chilton, Ambassador in Buenos Aires, to Sirnon, 18 March 1935 PRO FO 
371118628: A290311 11l2 . 
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by far the greater part was represented by oil and petroleum facilities. This data takes 
no account of changes in the value of money over time but is the best proxy for the 
distribution of business activities. However, if the data is accurate, it indicates that 
there was little real growth in the book value of investment in manufacturing between 
1935 and 1955 and possibly 1965 . Indeed, there was a tendency for investment in 
manufacturing to contract in the post-War period, particularly after 1965. In 1968 the 
total nominal value of British investment had declined to US$162 millions with the 
absolute decline of capital in manufacturing almost equalling the total contraction. 
Some 59 companies accounted for 95 per cent of British investment in Argentina in 
1968; 22 smaller firms were responsible for the balance. 105 Amongst the large 
enterprises were traditional processing companies like Forestal, Bovril and Leibigs; 
equally established firms such as British-American Tobacco and Alpargatas (an Anglo-
Argentine family textile business); and companies with more recently established 
branches, such as Babcock and Wilcox , Perkins , Plessey , Pilkingtons , Shell, 
Beechams, Lever Brothers and ICI associates. 
How is the cautious approach of British firms in the manufacturing sector to be 
explained? There were hardly any new entrants after the 1950s. Perkins , producing 
tractor motors and compressors, opened a factory at Cordoba in 1963 . It was one 
(possibly the only one) of a very small number of British companies to set up 
operations in Argentina at this time. 106 Exisiting firms appeared content to do little 
more than maintain exisi ting operations, losing market share when competitors were 
prepared to invest in additional capacity. In the surge of new foreign investment 
which occurred in the mid and late 1960s, British firms were largely conspicious by 
their absence. Between 1962 and 1968 several local businesses were absorbed by 
105 N. Minsburg, Inversiones extranjeras y dependencia (Buenos Aires, 1975) , pp . 
81-2. 
106 James P. Brennan , The Labor Wars in Cordoba, 1955-1976: ideology, work and 
labor politics in an Argentine industrial city, (Cambridge, Mass . 1994), p.36. 
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foreign capital, mostly by US conglomerates but also by continental European 
companies seeking to challenge their North American competitors. 107 
Perhaps , given the character of the immediate post-war decades, it would be more 
reasonable to enquiry why these firms did not, like the meat packers, abandon 
operations in Argentina . The general contraction in the British business community 
in the late 1940s, with the nationalisation of the railways and public utilities , must 
initially have had an adverse impact on the confidence to those firms and managers 
who remained. Subsequently, the poor performance of the economy which was 
characterised by shortening cycles of modest growth and stagnation, accelerating 
inflation, repeated balance of payment crises, and an unpredictable regime of exchange 
control also discouraged initiatives. Sluggish market expansion and the deteriorating 
political environment - corruption and capricious intervention were specifically 
mentioned by some managers - would have had a similar impact. 108 Perhaps of equal 
concern was the burgeoning set of regulations associated with policies of import-
substitution and social welfare. Peronist economic policies undoubtedly had an 
adverse impact on most large foreign companies. The near prohibition on profit 
remittances and a system of import licensing designed to favour domestic firms 
resulted in the paralysis of several US operations. Rigid control of manufacturing 
failed to promote industrial development. On the contrary, it fostered the growth of 
small , labour-intensive units and stalled the expansion of foreign investment in 
manufacturing set in motion before the Second World War. 109 After the fall of Per6n 
107 Gary W. Wynia, Argentina in the Post-war Era: politics and economic policy-
making in a divided country, (Albuquerque, 1978) , pp.209-21O; Lewis , Crisis of 
Argentine Capitalism, pp.313-4. 
108 Mallon and Sourrouille, Economic Policymaking, chapter 1; Charles Wilson, 
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(London, 1968) , III , 256-7 . 
109 Brennan, The Labor Wars, pp.6, 30; Lewis, The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism, 
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in 1955 the debate about the role of foreign capital in the manufacturing sector 
intensified rather than subsided . Nationalist sentiments were fuelled by the growth 
new foreign direct investment in the 1960s. There were sharp shifts in official policy , 
regulations became more stringent and terrorist attacks on the property and personnel 
of transnational corporations began. 110 When these policies were reversed after 1976, 
the opening of the economy to imports hardly encouraged optimism on the part of 
exisiting producers. 
Nevertheless , the sub-sectoral spread of British firms in Argentina probably accounts 
for the relatively poorer performance of British business, compared with US and other 
foreign rivals, during these difficult years. Official data indicates that the sector 
underwent a substantial transformation between 1954 and 1974. As indicated above, 
one feature of this period was concentration. There was a substantial increase in new 
investment and the number of fi rms declined . Another was marked differences in sub-
sectoral performance . Dynamic branches such as metallurgical goods, motor vehicles 
and machinery registered dramatic increases in output and participation in total 
industrial production while the share of traditional branches such as food and 
beverages , textiles and leather goods in total output contracted. III British firms tended 
to be over-represented in the latter sub-sectors. 
110 Lewis, The Crisis of Argentine Capilalism, pp.31O-313; Wynia , Argentina in the 
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A Century of Expansion and Ossification 
Three phases can be determined in the Anglo-Argentine business connexion: the first 
drew to a close in the 1880s and may be characterised as one of growth and 
diversification; the second ran until the 1920s and might be depicted as a period of 
consolidation; the final phase was one of survival, but little substantive innovation, and 
it ended in sharp contraction. While individual firms may have displayed a vibrant 
response to changing local and international circumstances throughout the period , the 
general picture is one of increasing structural rigidity in the sectoral profile of British 
activities . 
During the first cycle, almost all enterprises, with the possible exception of one or two 
railways , might have been described as Anglo-Argentine entities. The vast majority 
of firms had attracted at least token local capital or had recruited effective indigenous 
representation . The profile of business activity changed after the 1890s . The pattern 
of export-led growth placed greater emphasis upon infrastructural investment and for 
various reasons the readjustments which occurred following the Baring Crisis tended 
to enhance the role of foreign private companies. By the turn of the century , the 
focus of British activities had tilted sharply towards railways and utilities and the 
administration of many firms became British rather than Anglo-Argentine. This 
tendency was assisted by the withdrawal of the state, the insolvency of many River 
Plate enterprises that had looked to London for debenture capital in the hectic 1880s 
and by a re-focusing of indigenous capital upon agriculture and related activities . 
Thereafter there was little radical change in the overall profile of British business 
initiative . Consequently, as the international environment became more competitive 
for Argentina during the immediate pre-First World War period and again in inter-war 
decades , British enterprises became more visible . Structural problems of the period 
were blamed on British firms . It was perhaps inevitable that the British-owned 
railway companies should become a focus of discontent. Urban utilities became 
another butt of near universal criticism. Economic nationalists regarded the 
persistence of foreign enterprises in these fields as a singular affront, a sentiment that 
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was popularised and generalised in the 1930s. By this stage, the Anglo-Argentine 
connexion was perceived as benefiting but a narrow spectrum of Argentine society. 
There had been a moment during the last major investment boom before the First 
World War when it appeared that the structure of British business interests in 
Argentina might evolve once again rather than stagnating. New initiatives in 
manufacturing and the proliferation of earlier extractive enterprises mirrored changes 
taking place amongst German and US investments in Argentina. This precocious trend 
was frus trated by a number of factors. The reduced availability of funds for overseas 
investment in London clearly inhibited, even if it did not entirely suffocate, the 
process. The location of manufacturing operations in Argentina by several 
conglomerates demonstrates that the spirit of transnational enterprise was alive if not 
particularly well in Britain. An equally critical factor may have been responses by 
traditional businesses and by the British government to the problems of the moment. 
Aware that British companies were increasingly exposed to foreign competition in 
Argentina in the 1920s and even more sensitive to the condition of some firms in the 
1930s, the authorities in London began to take a direct interest in British business 
affairs in the River Plate. This is not to say that government had not intervened on 
behalf of individual firms before the 1920s . The difference in the 1930s was that a 
co-ordinated strategy for Anglo-Argentine commercial and financial relations was 
gradually evolved at a time of recession when Britain's position was seen to be 
threatened by the twin problems of economic nationalism and US rivalry . The official 
British policy response was first to protect existing operations - and safeguard the 
interests of bond-holders - so as to secure a flow of remittances from the republic 
rather than to encourage diversification . Later, an official British emphasis on trade 
(associated in part with the continuation of exchange controls) rather than investment 
and production overseas, coupled with pessimism about long-term prospects for 
demand growth in Argentina, discouraged innitiatives . 
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